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June, 1950
TAXATION AND SEVERED MINERAL ESTATES
WILLARD S. SNYDER
of the Denver Bar *
It is well settled that the terms "mineral" or "mineral rights"
include oil and gas.' It is in that sense that the word "mineral" is
used herein. Solid minerals such as coal and iron are beyond the
scope of this article.
Inasmuch as the production of oil and gas is becoming more
and more prominent in the economy of the Rocky Mountain area,
it is important for the attorney to become acquainted with the legal
problems involved. This article is concerned with the following
problem: When the mineral estate is owned separately from the
surface estate, and the land is sold for delinquent taxes, does a
tax deed 2 carry the mineral estate?
First of all, there are some fundamentals that we should have
firmly in mind. It is well settled that separate estates may be
created in respect to minerals, including oil and gas. Such separate
estates may be created by a deed of the land excepting and reserv-
ing all or part of the minerals. Or the separate estates may be
created by a deed of all or a part of the minerals only. 3 The process
by which the separate estates are created is called a "severance."
If there has been no severance of the mineral estate from the
surface estate, the minerals in and under the land are a part
thereof and are taxable against the owner of the land.4 It would
follow, of course, that the recipient of a valid tax deed to such land
would become vested with both the surface and mineral estates in
and to such land.
Turning directly to the situation where there has been a prior
severance of the mineral estate, we find that our problem may be
divided into two major parts. These are: (1) where the tax deed
is invalid and (2) where the tax deed is valid.
PROBLEM WHERE TAX DEED IS INVALID
There are many more or less technical reasons why a tax deed
may be invalid. For example, it may be void for uncertainty of
description or it may be void because of recitals therein that show
a noncompliance with or violation of the statutes concerning tax
deeds and the antecedent procedure upon which said deeds are
based.5 Assuming that the tax deed is invalid, for some such reason,
it is unnecessary to distinguish between a tax deed based upon a
sale of the mineral rights, and a tax deed based upon a sale of the
* Written while Mr. Snyder was a graduate student at the University of Denver
College of Law.
;Crain v. Pure Oil Co., 25 F. 2d 824 (10 Cir. 1927).
The term ordinarily used in Colorado is "treasurer's deed." The term "tax deed"
is used herein for the sake of uniformity when referring to various Jurisdictions.
'Summers, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS (2d ed.) 5 784.
'Id., § 787.
'Calvat v, Juhan, 119 Colo. 561, 206 P. 2d 600 (19.49).
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land by its government description without, in terms, including or
excluding the mineral rights. In either case, the tax deed will not
in and of itself pass good and sufficient title to the severed mineral
estate, said estate being the one in which we are here interested.
Closely connected with the problem where the tax deed is in-
valid is the question of adverse possession. The holder of the tax
deed may admit its invalidity, but nevertheless argue that it con-
stituted color of title and seek to establish adverse possession to
the mineral estate. However, one of the most firmly established
and universally accepted rules of law in the field of oil and gas is
that after severance of the mineral rights, adverse possession of
the surface is not adverse possession of the oil and gas underneath.6
In a case involving a tax sale of mineral rights, the Supreme Court
of Colorado held that after a severance of the mineral rights,
possession of the surface does not constitute possession of the
mineral estate, and the owner of the minerals does not lose his
rights by any length of nonuser.7 Thus, it may be seen that adverse
possession of the severed mineral estate cannot be perfected except
by drilling a well and taking actual physical possession of the min-
erals and holding such possession for the statutory period.
PROBLEM WHERE TAX DEED IS VALID
An example may help to clarify the discussion. A is the fee
owner of Blackacre. A conveys Blackacre to B reserving and
excepting the minerals in and under the land. Later B fails to pay
his taxes. Blackacre is sold for taxes, the land being described by
its government description without expressly including or exclud-
ing the minerals. Ultimately a tax deed is issued to Y. The tax
deed and the procedure upon which it is based are valid. The only
question is: Does the tax deed carry the mineral estate? In other
words, does A or Y now own the mineral estate?
There has been no express ruling on this question by the
Supreme Court of Colorado. Consequently, it is necessary to look
to decisions from other jurisdictions in order that we may have
some basis for an opinion upon the point involved. Of course, Colo-
rado statutes and judicial precedents are controlling as far as they
are applicable. But there are questions of policy and emphasis
involved which have permitted the highest tribunals of the various
states to reach opposite results, and an effort will be made to tie
in these questions of policy and emphasis with the statutes and
judicial precedents of Colorado.
A mechanical aproach to the problem disclosed that in Arkan-
sas,, Minnesota,9 Missouri,"0 New Mexico," and Wyoming," it has
O 13 A. L. R. 375.
, Note 5, supra.
'Huffman v. Henderson Co., 184 Ark. 278, 42 S.W. 2d 221 (1931).
Washburn v. Gregory Co., 125 Minn. 491, 147 N. W. 706 (1914).
10 Kernkamp v. Wellsville Fire Brick Co., 237 Mo. App. 457, 170 S. W. 2d 692 (1943).11 SiiS v. Vosburg, 43 N. M. 255, 91 P. 2d 434 (1939).
12 Ohio oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency ..... Wyo ...... 179 P. 2d 773 (1947).
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been held that a tax deed in which the land is described by its gov-
ernment description does not pass title to a prior severed mineral
estate. In California,13 Mississippi, 4 and West Virginia, 5 it has
been held that a tax deed in which the land is described by its gov-
ernment description does pass title to a prior severed mineral es-
tate. Thus, we have the familiar situation of a conflict of authority,
although at least it can be said that the weight of authority is to
the effect that the tax deed does not pass title to the prior severed
mineral estate.
Of more importance than a mere weight of authority is the
reasoning upon which these various decisions are based. Some of
the above cited cases are not too helpful one way or the other. For
example, the supreme court of Wyoming in Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyom-
ing Agency, 1o without advancing much in the way. of reasons,
merely states the rule than when the mineral estate is owned separ-
ately from the surface estate, and the land is assessed in the name
of the owner of the surface, a valid tax sale would not seem to
carry the mineral estate. Then there are those states which advance
reasons for their holdings, but the logic involved would not be of
weight in Colorado, because of judicial precedents in Colorado. Un-
fortunately such holdings appear on both sides of the fence.
THE SAME YARDSTICK WITH DIFFERENT RESULTS
The California case of McCracken v. Hummel 17 holds that the
owner of the tax title acquired the oil and gas rights in the property
even though there had been a prior severance of the mineral es-
tate. The court reasons that since there were no separate assess-
ments of the severed oil rights, and since the same assessment
was placed upon the land as upon adjoining land where there
was no severed mineral estate, the assessment upon the land in
question included the severed oil rights; therefore, the holder of the
tax deed acquired title to both the surface estate and the mineral
estate.
The New Mexico case of Sims v. Vosburg 18 holds that the
holder of the tax title did not acquire the mineral rights in the prop-
erty when there had been a prior severance of the mineral estate.
The prior severance was in favor of private parties. The court
reasons that since the land in question was assessed at the same
value as adjacent and similar land from which the minerals had
been severed by the United States Government instead of private
parties (and could, therefore, not be taxed), the severed mineral in-
terests in question were neither assessed nor sold for taxes and
that the holder of the tax title obtained no title to the mineral in-
terests by virtue of his tax deed.
13McCracken v. Hummel, 43 Cal. App. 2d 302, 110 P. 2d 700 (1941).
4 Stern v. Parker, 200 Miss. 27, 25 So. 2d 787 (1946).





It will be seen immediately that the courts of California and
New Mexico have used the same reasoning. The yardstick used is
a comparison between the assessment of the land from which the
mineral estate has been severed and the assessment of adjoining
and similar land from which the mineral estate has either not been
severed, or, if it has been severed, the severance was in favor of the
government, in which event taxation of the mineral estate was
impossible.
Such reasoning is not necessarily valid. In the Colorado case
of Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Hanna,19 which involved a different
question, such reasoning was rejected. In that case, the railroad
was the owner of severed mineral estates in and under every odd-
numbered section of land in Weld County within 20 miles of the
railroad right of way. The proceeding before the court was an ac-
tion to reduce the assessed valuation of these reserved mineral
rights. The assessor had assessed the surface estates in the odd-
numbered sections from which the mineral estates had been severed
at the same value that he had assessed the land in the even-num-
bered sections from which the mineral estates had not been severed.
In addition to the assessment of the surface estate in the odd-
numbered sections, the assessor had assessed the reserved mineral
estates to their owner, the Union Pacific Co. The railroad argued
that this was discriminatory. The court rejected this argument,
saying that if the surface estate in the odd-numbered sections sub-
ject to mineral reservations is assessed too high, in comparison
with the assessment of the land in the even-numbered sections with-
out reservation, this works no hardship on the Union Pacific Co.,
-owner of the reserved mineral estates. Thus, the test used in Cali-
fornia and New Mexico of comparing the assessment of the sur-
face estate from which the minerals have been severed with the
assessment on adjoining land without reservations probably could
not be used in Colorado. For in Colorado, even though the surface
of the land subject to mineral reservations is assessed at-the same
value as adjoining land without reservations, the highest tribunal
in the state has taken the position that the surface estate subject
to the reservation may have been assessed too high, or the land
without reservations may have been assessed too low. Therefore,
even though the assessments on adjoining tracts of land (one being
subject to a mineral reservation, and the other not) are the same,
it would not follow that the assessment of the land subject to a min-
eral reservation was an assessment which included the minerals.
When there has been a prior severance of the mineral estate with no
separate assessment of that estate, and when the land is assessed
in the name of the owner of the surface, it would seem that a tax
sale in Colorado would not carry the severed mineral estate, for
there would be no practical way of showing that the severed min-
19 73 Colo. 162, 214 P. 550 (1923).
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eral estate had even been assessed, let alone sold at the tax sale.
However, it should be emphasized that the problem and facts under
consideration in the Union Pacific case were entirely different from
the subject under discussion here, and the language used by the
court in that case would not necessarily be controlling if the court
were called upon to decide the question here involved.
SEPARATE ASSESSMENT STATUTES NOT Too HELPFUL
Other courts have taken a different approach to the problem
from that taken in California and New Mexico. Some states have
what are termed "separate assessment statutes." That is, it is pro-
vided by statute that when the surface estate and mineral estate
are separately owned, they may, or must, be separately assessed.
Colorado has no such statute. Even so, it was expressly held by
the Colorado Supreme Court in Union Pacific RR. Co. v. Hanna '
0
that a severed mineral estate was separately assessable to the owner
thereof. A person would expect that in a state having a separate
assessment statute a tax sale would not carry the severed mineral
estate. The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Huffman v. Henderson
Co.,21 so held on the basis of Arkansas's separate assessment statute.
But the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in the case of Stern v. Par-
ker,22 held that the tax sale carried the severed mineral estate. This
conclusion was reached notwithstanding the fact that Mississippi
has a separate assessment statute 23 which, in referring to a severed
mineral estate, provides: "all of such interest shall be assessed, and
taxed separately from such surface rights." It appears that the
separate assessment statute is not as important a factor in deter-
mining whether a tax sale will carry the severed minerals as initial
appearances might indicate. Mississippi takes the position that it
was the duty of the owner of the severed mineral estate to see that
it was separately assessed and that such owner had failed in his
duty by not paying taxes on his mineral estate. As a matter of
policy, it was thought that the payment of taxes should be encour-
aged, that attempts to evade just taxes should be discouraged,
and that the owner of the severed mineral estate was in no
position to complain. As to the question of whether the severed
mineral estate had ever been assessed, the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi took what might be called a practical approach. The court
states that when the land was assessed by its government descrip-
tion, the land was assessed in its entirety, and this means all of its
assessable estate.
The Minnesota case of Washburn v. Gregory Co.24 is a leading
case often cited by those courts which hold that a tax sale in which
the land was described by its government desctription without in-
cluding or excluding the minerals held by a person other than the
20 Note 19, supra.
2Note 8, supra.
"Note 14, 8upra.




owner of the surface does not carry such severed mineral estate.
The Minnesota court takes a duty approach to the problem by hold-
ing that it is the duty of the taxing officers to assess and tax separ-
ately the interests of the owner of the minerals and the owner of
the surface. The court states that when the land sold for taxes is
described by its government description, it will not be presumed
that the separate property of another (the owner of the minerals)
is included in the general description used in the tax proceedings.
The Mississippi Supreme Court puts the emphasis on the duty
of the owner of the minerals to see that his property is separately
assessed and that he pays taxes thereon. The Minnesota Supreme
Court emphasizes the duty of the taxing officers to separately assess
the separate estate, and thereby these two courts reach opposite
results. Yet it is believed that it is generally the duty of the tax-
ing officers to assess all taxable property, and it is the duty of the
owner of the taxable property to return it for taxation. Such is
the law in Colorado. 25  Although there are persuasive arguments
to support the Mississippi court in its holding that a tax sale passes
title to the prior severed mineral estate, it still is not felt that Colo-
rado could accept the Mississippi court's holding that when there is
a prior severance of the mineral estate, the assessment of the land
by its government description includes the land in its entirety, i.e.
all of its assessable estates. Before Colorado could accept this prop-
osition, it would be necessary for our Supreme Court to reject the
same kind of reasoning that it advanced in support of its decision
in Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Hanna.
26
A PRACTICAL SUGGESTION
It is of course apparent that in a question such as we are con-
cerned with here, it is impossible to predict absolutely what the
law in Colorado may be determined to be at some future day. The
best that can be hoped for is what might be called an educated
guess. Preventive jurisprudence has been called the most useful
branch of the law. If a person is the owner of a severed mineral
estate in Colorado, and if he wants to protect his said estate fully,
it is suggested that he write to the assessor requesting a separate
assessment of his mineral estate. If minerals are not being pro-
duced thereon, it will be assessed for a nominal amount, and by
paying the tax assessed, he will be fully protected. Possible litiga-
tion will be avoided, and the owner of the severed mineral estate
will have the satisfaction of knowing that his title is perfectly safe.
THE BOOK TRADER'S CORNER
In the bullish market for a complete set of Colorado reports
is the firm of Davis and Lutz, 636 Symes Bldg., Denver, Main 1215.
w The People v. Pitcher, 61 Colo. 149, 170, 156 P. 812 (1916) ; COLO. STAT. ANN., c.
142, J§ 2, 20, 48, and 50 (1935).
26 See note 19, supra.
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